



AUTHENTICATED ANONYMOUS SECURE AND FASTEST ROUTING FOR MANET

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Abstract-Anonymous communications are important for many applications of the mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) deployed in adversary environments. The existing system uses the topology based anonymous on demand secure routing protocol. However, these are vulnerable to the attacks of fake routing packets or denial-of-service (DoS) broad-casting even the node identities are protected by pseudonyms. In this work, an authenticated anonymous secure routing protocol is proposed which provides security against vulnerable attacks. By using this protocol the data is authenticated by a group signature to defend the potential active attacks without unveiling the node identities. This group signature scheme is designed to prevent intermediate nodes from inferring a real destination. The key encrypted onion routing scheme protects the data being modified by the malicious node. So we can safeguard the information's of one client from the other.

Keywords: MANET, Secure, Communication, intermediate.

I.INTRODUCTION

A mobile Adhoc network (MANET) is a continuously self-configuring, infrastructure-less network of mobile devices connected without wires. Ad hoc is Latin and means "for this purpose". Each device in a MANET is free to move independently in any direction, and will therefore change its links to other devices frequently. Each must forward traffic unrelated to its own use, and therefore be a router. The primary challenge in building a MANET is equipping each device to continuously maintain the information required to properly route traffic. Such networks may operate by themselves or may be connected to the larger Internet. They may contain one or multiple and different transceivers between

nodes. This results in a highly dynamic, autonomous topology.

MANETs are a kind of Wireless ad hoc network that usually has a routable networking environment on top of a Link Layer ad hoc network. MANETs consist of a peer-to-peer, self-forming, self-healing network in contrast to a mesh network has a central controller (to determine, optimize, and distribute the routing table). MANETs circa 2000-2015 typically communicate at radio frequencies (30 MHz - 5 GHz).

II.PROPOSED METHOD

In this, propose an authenticated anonymous secure routing (AASR) to overcome the pre-mentioned problems. adopt a key-encrypted scheme to record a discovered route and design an encrypted secret message to verify the RREQ-RREP linkage. Group signature is used to authenticate the RREQ packet per hop, to prevent intermediate nodes from modifying the routing packet. The performance of AASR to that of ANODR, a representative on-demand anonymous routing protocol. The results show that, it provides more throughput than ANODR under the packet-dropping attacks, although AASR experiences more cryptographic operation delay. Once a path is identified by the returning searchcontrol packets, this entire path is embedded in each datapacket to that destination. Thus, intermediate nodes do not even need a forwarding table to transfer these packets. Because of its reactive nature, it is more appropriate for occasional or lightweight data transportation in MANETs. AODV, DSDV, and other DV-based routing algorithms were not designed for source routing; hence, they are not suitable for opportunistic data forwarding. The reason is that every node in these protocols only knows the next hop to reach a given destination node but not the



complete path. In this, introduce the basic concepts in anonymous routing, and provide a short survey on the existing routing protocols.

III. OPERATION

a. Time is divided into equal slots of duration T . At the beginning of each slot, each node s generates a temporary public-private key-pair: PK-TMPs and SK-TMPs, respectively. PK-TMPs is subsequently used by other nodes to encrypt session keys to establish secure channels with s . Note that these keys can be generated offline.

b. Each node broadcasts a Location Announcement Message (LAM), containing its location (GPS coordinates), time-stamp, temporary public key (PK-TMPs), and a group signature computed over these fields. Each LAM is flooded throughout the MANET [3].

c. Upon receipt of a new LAM, a node first checks that it has not received the same LAM before, it then verifies the time-stamp and group signature. If both are valid, the node rebroadcasts the LAM to its neighbors. Having collected all current LAMs, each node constructs a geographical map of the MANET [2] and a corresponding node connectivity graph. Between successive LAMs, a node can be reached (addressed) using a temporary pseudonym formed as current location concatenated with the group signature in the last LAM ($\text{TmpID} = f(\text{Location}, \text{GSig})$). Note that the pseudonym represents a valid address even if the actual node moves in the interim. The location is included in the pseudonym in order to minimize required state and assist in the forwarding process. If the location is not part of the pseudonym, a node forwarding a message to a pseudonym would have to look up the associated location and decide how to forward to that location. Including location in the pseudonym speeds up the forwarding process and requires fewer look-ups.

d. Whenever a node desires to communicate with a certain location, it checks to see if any node currently exists at (or near) that location. If so, it sends a message to the destination's current pseudonym (TmpID). This message is encrypted with a session key using a symmetric cipher. The session key is, in turn, encrypted under the current public key (PK-TMP) included in

the destination's latest LAM. When the destination receives the message, it first recovers the session key and uses it to decrypt the rest. ALARM is not restricted to any specific public key technique. One obvious choice is Diffie-Hellman (DH), whereby each LAM includes an ephemeral (period-specific) DH half-key. The sender then simply generates its own DH half-key, computes a shared key and encrypts the session key with it. Clearly, the sender's half-key must be included in the clear-text part of the message. Other key agreement schemes can also be used.

e. Forwarding: As described above, nodes disseminate current topology by periodically flooding LAMs. Once each node has the entire topology view, it decides whether to communicate with a certain location (node). Message forwarding is independent of topology dissemination. One option is for a node to create a source route, explicitly encoding locations of nodes on the path to the destination. The actual path can be computed using the shortest path algorithm or any other location-aided routing algorithm. Assume that the node at location 1 ($\text{TmpID}_1 = f(\text{Location}_1, \text{GSig}_1)$) requires sending a message to another node at location 4 ($\text{TmpID}_4 = f(\text{Location}_4, \text{GSig}_4)$). The sender calculates the route to location 4 and determines that it has to pass through location 2 and location 3. It then generates a session key (K_s) and encrypts data with that key using asymmetric cipher (e.g., AES). It then uses the public key in the last LAM of location 4 to encrypt K_s and assembles a data message with the destination set to (TmpID_4) and source—to (TmpID_1). It finally composes a source route: $\langle \text{TmpID}_2; \text{TmpID}_3 \rangle$.

Despite the amount of effort in routing in ad hoc networks, data forwarding, in contrast, follows the same paradigm as in Internet Protocol (IP) forwarding in the Internet. IP forwarding was originally designed for multihop wired networks, where one packet transmission can be only received by nodes attached to the same cable. However, in wireless networks, when a packet is transmitted over a physical channel, it can be that channel. Traditionally, overhearing a packet not intended for the receiving node had been considered completely negative, i.e., interference. Thus, in a sense, the goal of the research in wireless networking was to make wireless links as good as wired links.

IV. RESULT AND DISCUSSION

A. Network Model

In this module, first forming the network and send hello packets to the particular node networks. Forming a group. Grouping means number of nodes.




Figure 4.1 Group Formation

B. Path selection

In this module, the node decrypting the location and it is not a destination so encrypt the text and send to another node. There is a packet loss in source side.




Figure 4.2 Path Selection

C. Data Transmission

In this module, data transmitted from source to destination and the lossless path is selected.




Figure 4.3 Data Transmission

D. Energy Consumption




Figure 4.4 Graph of Energy V/S No of Node

E. End to End delay




Figure 4.5 Graph of Delay V/S No of Nodes




Figure 4.7 Graph of Packet loss V/S Time

F. Throughput




Figure 4.6 Graph of Throughput V/S Time

G. Packet loss

In this graph, packet loss per time is given.

V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK

In this section, an authenticated and anonymous routing protocol for MANETs in adversarial environments is designed. The route request packets are authenticated by group signatures, which can defend the potential active anonymous attacks without unveiling the node identities. The key-encrypted onion routing with a route secret verification message is designed to not only record the anonymous routes but also prevent the intermediate nodes from inferring the real destination. Compared to ANODR, AASR provides higher throughput and lower packets loss ratio in different mobile scenarios in the presence of adversary attacks. It also provides better support for the secure communications that are sensitive to packet loss ratio. In our future work, we will improve AASR to reduce the packet delay. A possible method is to combine it with a trust-based routing. With the help of the trust model, the routing protocols will be more active in detecting link failures, caused either by the mobility or adversary attacks.



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