



# REPLICATIONS ON BELIEF IN DEVICES: AN INFORMAL SURVEY OF GROUP CONFIDENCE FOR SECURITY AND DATA MANAGEMENT IN AN IOT PERSPECTIVE

## DR.RAMESH D

Professor, Dept. of CSE, SSIT  
Sri Siddhartha Academy Of Higher Education  
Tumkur,India  
rameshd\_ssit@yahoo.com

## ASHOK KUMAR N

Research Scholar,SSIT  
Sri Siddhartha Academy Of Higher Education  
Tumkur,India  
ashok87ssit@gmail.com

## ABSTRACT

The Internet-of-Things (IoT) is an interacting prototype where interconnected, cool objects constantly generate data and communicate it above the Internet. Ample of the IoT enterprises are geared on the way to built-up low-cost then energy-efficient hardware on behalf of these objects, as well as the communication tools that provide things interconnectivity. The resolutions to manage and exploit the considerable work of data created by these objects are yet to established. IoT are ubiquitous in our daily lifecycle. They are used in our households, in hospices, deployed outdoor to regulator and report the variations in atmosphere, preclude fires, and several more advantageous functionality. Conversely, all those remunerations can come of massive risks of discretion loss and security concerns. To shelter the IoT devices, many exploration works have been accompanied to countermeasure those difficulties and find a improved way to eliminate those hazards, or at least diminish their possessions on the user's secrecy and security necessities. Traditional database management clarifications fall short in satiating the sophisticated tender needs of an IoT system that has an accurately global-scale. The survey consists of three segments. The first segment will explore the most significant limitations of IoT devices and their resolutions. The second one will extant the classification of IoT attacks. The last subdivision will investigate the security and data administration problems in different layers.

**Keywords:** Internet of Things (IoT), data administration, privacy, security sensor networks.

## I. INTRODUCTION

INTERNET-OF-THINGS (IoT) is an assembly of "things" rooted with electronics, software, antennas, actuators, and associated via the Internet to gather and interchange data with every other. The IoT devices are armed with sensors and dispensation power that facilitate them to be arrayed in many environments. Figure. 1 presents a multiplicity of common IoT applications, counting smart home, smart city, smart grid-irons, medical and healthcare tools, connected automobiles, etc. The fast development of the number of IoT devices consumed is predicted to reach 41 billion in 2020 through an \$8.9 trillion market [1] as stated in the 2013 report of the International Data Corporation. The variance between IoT and the traditional Internet is the non-attendance of Human role. The IoT devices can generate information about personality's behaviours, scrutinize it, and take action [2]. Amenities provided by IoT presentations offer a great advantage for human's life, but they can originate with a huge price in view of the person's privacy in addition to security protection.

As the IoT industrialists unsuccessful to implement a robust security structure in the devices, safety experts have informed the potential risk of enormous numbers of indiscreet devices joining to the Internet. In December of 2013, an investigator at Proofpoint, an enterprise security firm, discovered the first IoT botnet. According to Proofpoint, more than 25% of the botnet was prepared of devices other than computers, including smart TVs, baby monitors, and other household appliances. On October 21, 2016, many websites including: Etsy, SoundCloud, Twitter, Netflix, Spotify, Airbnb, Reddit, and The New York Times, were informed

inaccessible by users triggered by a distributed denial of service attack (DDoS) attack by means of a network of consumer devices from the IoT. Security and privacy remain gigantic issues for IoT devices, which announce a whole new degree of operational privacy concerns for consumers. That is because these devices not only collect personal data like users' names and telephone numbers, but can also observe user activities (e.g., when users are in their firms and what they took for lunch). Subsequent never-ending sequence of disclosures about most important data breaches, customers are wary of employing too much personal data in public or private clouds, with good reason [5]. There are many distributed surveys on IoT safekeeping issues and challenges. Sicari *et al.* [7] existing research challenges and the existing solutions in the field of IoT security concentrating on the main security issues which were recognized in eight categories: 1) authentication; 2) policy enforcement; 3) confidentiality; 4) privacy; 5) mobile security; 6) secure middleware; 7) trust; and 8) access control. They raised some undeveloped issues, and proposing some hints for forthcoming research. Roman *et al.* [8] focused on the investigation of the centralized and disseminated approaches. They introduced an invader model that was functional to both consolidated and distributed IoT architectures, and calculated the main challenges and auspicious solutions in the design and arrangement of the security appliances. [3] proposed a system, this fully automatic vehicle is equipped by micro controller, motor driving mechanism and battery. The power stored in the battery is used to drive the DC motor that causes the movement to AGV. The speed of rotation of DC motor i.e., velocity of AGV is controlled by the microprocessor controller. This is an era of automation where it is broadly defined as replacement of manual effort by mechanical power in all degrees of automation. The operation remains an essential part of the system although with changing demands on physical input as the degree of mechanization is increased.




Figure 1. IoT applications.

### A. Trust and Trustworthiness

**Trust:** By trust we mean confidence on the truthfulness, capability or charm of an entity. Regulator and requirement plays a role here, besides we may be obligated to rely on articles due their magnificent authority (control) or to nonexistence of replacements (essential). Trust can be further enlightened in positions of self-reliance in the truth or assets of an entity. The catch here is that we want to apply this to human valuation of "truth or worth" of conspicuously non-human procedures.

**Trustworthiness:** This concept is related to trust and points to worthiness of trust or belief. An entity actuality trustworthy implies that other parties believe that the entity will take accountability for its actions, its



conduct and its responsibilities. There must of progression also be preparedness and ability to conform to this belief on part of the trustworthy object. Unnecessary to say, the trustworthiness is interpersonal and relative, and it may mean diverse things to dissimilar entities. For humans there is an virtuous dimension to actuality trustworthy; this impression clearly does not apply to policies. Instead, for devices, one is left with a probabilistic conception of objective and ability (i.e. the probability that the device will “intend” do as expected combined with ability to actually do so). The “ability” to conduct yourself as expected must be existing in under adverse situations.

In the perspective of a human user and an IoT device, we note that the above may prejudice humans to trust frequently used devices and amenities, in particular if the happenstance represents a run-of-the-mill event. Devices and facilities we seldom use, or for cases that are professed to be external our control, may be disbelieved since we assume a too extraordinary risk. For both cases there may be a divergence between the actual risk level and the human trust in the device.

Data management and big data analytics tools will be the fundamental enabler of new principles created by the juncture of the Internet of Things (IoT), people and the corporeal world. An emergent class of data warehouse and analytics tools, which are progressively tailored to report unique IoT data requirements, will be precarious to recognizing the full prospective of smart structures.

## II. IoT DEVICE LIMITATIONS

Why is it challenging to secure and apply security topographies to IoT as those used in out-of-date Internet? Trappe *et al.* [9] presented the issue of IoT restrictions, and their effects on with current cryptographic tools as the ones employed in traditional Internet. The two main constraints are the battery capacity and computing power.

### A. Battery Life Extension

As some IoT devices are positioned in environments where charging is not obtainable, they only have an inadequate energy to execute the calculated functionality and heavyweight security directions can drain the devices' properties. Three possible methodologies can be used to diminish this issue. The first is to use the least possible security necessities on the device, which is not suggested especially when production with complex data. The second approach is to escalation the battery capacity. However, most IoT devices are considered to be lightweight and in unimportant size. There is no additional room for a bigger battery. The final method is to ingathering energy from natural capitals (e.g., light, hotness, shuddering, and wind), but this type of methodology would require an advancement to the hardware and meaningfully increase the economic cost.

### B. Lightweight Reckoning

The paper [9] mentioned that unadventurous cryptography cannot work on IoT schemes, since the devices have inadequate memory space which cannot switch the computing and storage necessities of progressive cryptography algorithms. To backing security mechanisms for the controlled devices, the novelists suggested recycling existing functions. An instance is to use corporal layer authentication by spread over signal processing at the receiver side to authenticate whether a broadcast came from the probable transmitter in the expected locality. Otherwise, specific analog physical characteristics of a transmitter can be cast-off to effectively encode analog statistics. These analog distinctions cannot be forecast or controlled in manufacturing, and can assist as an exceptional key. This way of authentication has little or no energy overhead since it takes improvement of radio signals. Shafagh *et al.* [10] proposed an encrypted query processing algorithm for IoT. The methodology allows to steadily store encrypted IoT statistics on the cloud, and supports resourceful database query processing above encrypted data. Specifically, they consume alternative lightweight cryptographic algorithms that substitute additive homomorphic encryption and order-preserving encryption through Elliptic Curve ElGamal and inconsistent order preserving encoding algorithms, where they IoT devices. The system pattern replaces the Web application statement with an end-to-end (E2E) structure that stores encrypted numbers from personal strategies on cloud database, and data encryption/decryption is accomplished at the client-side. The typesetting material will only be located in the individual device, and the need of a confidential proxy which has admittance to all the secret keys is abolished. The system architecture includes three leading parties: 1) IoT devices; 2) consumers; and 3) the cloud. The application data can be stored in the cloud by directly uploading it by the smart device or via a gateway like a wearable device. The paper addressed only selected encryption schemes that maintain the most used queries in IoT data dispensation. However, the scheme can be extended to cover more structures. The experimentation results showed an enhancement in the time presentation likened to existing structures.



### III. CLASSIFICATIONS ON IoT ATTACKS

Foregoing survey mechanisms have conducted widespread studies on IoT security. They require provided understanding classifications of IoT attacks and explanations. Andrea *et al.* [13] come up with a novel classification of IoT policies attacks obtainable in four distinct types: 1) physical; 2) encryption; 3) software; and 4) network attacks. Each one shelters a layer of the IoT assembly (physical, network, and application), in accumulation to the IoT protocols for numbers encryption. The physical attack is executed when the attacker is in a adjacent distance of the device. The network attacks be made up of of manipulating the IoT network structure to cause damage. The software attacks come about when the IoT applications exist some security vulnerabilities that agree the attacker to take hold of the opportunity and damage the system. Encryption assaults consist of infringement of the system encryption. This caring of attacks can be done by side network, cryptanalysis, and man-in-the-middle attacks. They also available a multi-layered security methodologies to address the IoT structure layers and encryption system vulnerabilities and security issues. Grounded on the study, to countermeasure the security problems at the physical layer, the device has to use protected booting by applying a cryptographic hash algorithms and digital signature to verify its authentication and the integrity of the software. Also, a new method must substantiate itself to the network in advance any transmission or reception of documents. In addition to that, a device should carry an error detection system, and all of its facts have to be encrypted to maintain data integrity and discretion. At the network layer, authentication mechanisms and point-to-point encryption can be used to ensure data privacy and routing security. The application layer can also make available security by means of authentication, encryption, and integrity substantiation, which permits only the authorized customers to access data over and done with control lists and firewalls, in calculation to the use of anti-virus software.




Figure. 2. IoT layered analysis.



#### IV. IoT SECURITY AT DIFFERENT LAYERS AND IOT DATA MANAGEMENT

This accumulation of IoT security perceptions considers current trends, attack vectors, and outlines the gaps in the existing ecosystem. We are currently witnessing a growing number of IoT deployments and solutions around the ecosphere. IoT security is evolving as a key component of these dispositions and companies are identifying they need to get it right from the beginning – By 2022, the IoT security market is prognostication to reach \$4.4 billion. Various industry surveys, as well as our own research, designate cybersecurity is the #1 concern for industrial IoT customers today.

IoT Security is key for the secure development and secure manoeuvre of scalable IoT applications and services that connect the real and virtual worlds between objects, systems, and people. However, as our recent 3-part introductory series on Understanding IoT Security shows, IoT security is complex and the market landscape is largely fragmented with a host of vendors competing to address the opportunity. Fundamentally we start our focus to expand on five IoT Security insights congregated from our on-going marketplace research:

##### A. IoT Security Spending Is Rapidly Increasing




Figure.3

Global spending for end-users of 3<sup>rd</sup> party security solutions is currently estimated at \$703M for 2017 and is forecast to grow at a CAGR of 44% to become a \$4.4B market by 2022, driven by new regulation and increasing IoT adoption. In addition to the security tools provided by IoT platforms (which are not part of this figure) the IoT security market is an aggregation of innovative startups and established firms such as global chip manufacturers, infrastructure providers, as well as cloud and enterprise software companies. There are at least 150 independent IoT security vendors addressing the challenges across all industries – of which Industrial/Manufacturing is the biggest segment for IoT security.

##### B. IoT Introduces an Increased Number of Security Threats

$$\text{Cybersecurity Risk} = \frac{\text{Threat Level} \times \text{Probability of Attack} \times \text{Points of Exposure}}{\text{Cybersecurity Measures Implemented}}$$



One of the big differences between the Internet of Things and previous internet technology is that the number of possible threats is much larger, due to the following (based on the above equation for the level of cyber security risk from Bosch):

- **More points of exposure:** The growing number of connected devices, applications, systems and end users mean more points of exposure.
- **IoT devices themselves become new attack vectors:** Every compromised device becomes a new possible attack point, which by definition means a higher probability of attacks.
- **Increased impact of attacks:** With more connected devices in many applications (i.e., hundreds of different use cases which all build on different standards, interact with different systems and have different goals – for example, see the Enterprise IoT Project List for 640+ different use cases), especially critical infrastructure applications where there is an increased impact of attacks (i.e., damage to the physical world and possible loss-of-life), the stakes are much higher for hackers which increases the threat level.
- **New threats from across the stack:** In addition, a more complex technology stack means new threats are possible from across the stack (i.e., from the different hardware, communication, and software elements – see Insight 2) which must be counteracted by the implemented cyber security measures and by experienced security professionals.

**Example:** A large industrial components manufacturer we recently talked to is now connecting legacy equipment on the shop floor to the internet to enable condition monitoring and predictive maintenance solutions. They concluded that by connecting the operational technology (OT) system and the information technology (IT) system – which were previously operating on two separate Wi-Fi networks within the same building – it creates new points of exposure that can be attacked. In particular, they noted that compromised 3<sup>rd</sup> party applications (i.e., from maintenance/service providers) could act as an entry point to the network and be taken advantage of to access other connected systems and bring production to a standstill.

### C. IoT Security Happens on Four Different Layers




Figure.4



IoT solution architectures require multi-layered security approaches that seamlessly work together to provide complete end-to-end security from device to cloud and everything in between throughout the lifecycle of the solution. The 4 layers consist of:

- **Device:** The device layer refers to the hardware level of the IoT solution i.e., the physical “thing” or product. ODMs and OEMs (who design and produce devices) are increasingly integrating more security features in both their hardware and software (that is running on the device) to enhance the level of security on the device layer. Security components include: physical security, data at rest, chip security, secure boot, device authentication and device identity.
- **Communication:** The communication layer refers to the connectivity networks of the IoT solution i.e., mediums over which the data is securely transmitted/received. Whether sensitive data is in transit over the physical layer (e.g., WiFi, 802.15.4 or Ethernet), networking layer (e.g, IPv6, Modbus or OPC-UA), or application layer (e.g., MQTT, CoAP or web-sockets) unsecured communication channels can be susceptible to intrusions such as man-in-the-middle attacks. Security components include: access control, firewall, IPS, IDS, and end-to-end encryption.
- **Cloud:** The cloud layer refers to the software backend of the IoT solution i.e., where data from devices is ingested, analyzed and interpreted at scale to generate insights and perform actions. IoT cloud providers are expected to deliver secure and efficient cloud services by default to protect from major data breaches or solution downtime issues. Security components include: data at rest, platform and application integrity verification.
- **Lifecycle management:** Secure Lifecycle Management refers to an overarching layer with continuous processes required to keep the security of an IoT solution up-to-date i.e., ensuring sufficient security levels are in place from device manufacture, initial installation to the disposal of things. Security components include: risk assessment, policies & auditing, activity monitoring, updates and patches, vendor control, user awareness assessment, and secure decommissioning.

One should also note, at this point (Q4/2017) there is no single IoT security vendor that can provide the complete end-to-end out-of-the-box security solution. However, some companies offer more than others and together with their partner ecosystem some can provide a complete end-to-end IoT security solution.

#### **D. Increasing Automation of IoT Security Tasks**

With forecasted growth to billions of IoT devices, manually handling security tasks (e.g., revoking certificates, isolating compromised devices), as is still the case in many solutions today, will not be feasible. Security automation techniques that merge security solutions and artificial intelligence are becoming more and more prevalent.

For example, next-generation activity monitoring enables advanced anomaly detection, building on sophisticated machine learning algorithms. One case includes objectively classifying ‘good’ files from ‘bad’ files based on mathematical risk factors, which means it becomes possible to teach a machine to make the appropriate decisions on these files in real time. This method drives autonomous decision making and changes the way an IoT device understands, categorizes, and controls the execution of every file.

**Example:** Their approach begins with the collection of a massive amount of data, from which they identify a broad possible set of attributes for a file. Converting these attributes to numerical values means they can be used in mathematical models. Vectorization and machine learning are applied to these models to eliminate the human impurities and speed up analytical processing. Mathematicians then develop statistical models that accurately predict whether a file is valid or malicious enabling them to discover and quarantine threats at the endpoint.



### E. Cyber espionage Groups and Petty Criminals Are the Most Common IoT Attackers




Figure.5

The five main types of IoT attackers today are:

- **Amateur hackers:** e.g., script kiddies, hobbyists.
- **Petty criminals:** e.g., low-level cyber criminals.
- **Cyber espionage groups:** e.g., organized syndicates or crime groups such as Armada Collective, Black Vine, GreenBug.
- **Terrorists / hacktivists:** e.g., professional, non-state actors such as Oxblood Ruffin or political hacktivists.
- **State sponsored attackers:** e.g., foreign espionage via state-sponsored sabotage and traditional adversarial nation-states e.g., Russia, China.

Each class of attacker may have different abilities, capabilities, and goals – whether on an individual or group basis (i.e., aggregating resources to work together). Given the same tool different classes of attackers may achieve different outcomes e.g., experienced cyber criminals can evade deep packet inspection tools or IDS signature detection tools whereas new hobbyists may not.

Applying existing Internet standards to smart devices can simplify the integration of the envisioned scenarios in the IoT contexts. However, the security mechanisms in conventional Internet protocols need to be modified or extended to support the IoT applications. In this section, we discuss these security problems and existing solutions in different layers of IoT systems (Fig. 2).

#### A1. IoT Perception Layer Security

IoT system is planned to collect and interchange data from the corporal world. Hence, the perception layer comprises various types of accumulating and supervisory modules, such as the high temperature sensors, sound sensors, trembling sensors, compression sensors, etc. The perception layer can be further alienated into two quantities: perception node (sensors or controllers, etc.), perception network that interconnects with transportation network [27]. Perception node is used for data attainment YANG et al.: SURVEY ON SECURITY AND PRIVACY ISSUES IN IoT 1255 and data regulator, perception network directs collected files to the gateway, or guides control tutoring to the controller. Perception layer technologies take account of WSNs, implantable medical policies (IMDs), radio-frequency identification, global positioning system, etc. One perception layer security problem is the detection of the abnormal sensor node. This could come about when



thenode is physically attacked (e.g., destroyed and deactivated)or intruded/compromised by cyber-attacks. These nodes are termed as faulty nodes in universal. In order to guarantee the quality of provision, it is necessary to be capable to detect the faulty nodes and take activities to avoid advance degradation of the service. One more perception layer security alarm is the cryptography algorithms and key management apparatus to be used. Public key algorithm has been considered appropriate for node authentication. It has bigger scalability and can have enhanced security of the entire network without complex key management protocol [27]. According to Gaubatz et al. [31], three low-power public key encryption algorithms are the most auspicious candidates for WSNs: Rabin's scheme, NtruEncrypt, and elliptic curve cryptography. Key administration includes secret key generation, distribution, storing, bring up-to-date, and destruction. Current key distribution scheme can be separated into four clusters: 1) key broadcast distribution [32], [33]; 2) group key distribution [34], [35]; 3) master key predistribution; and 4) pairwise key distribution [36], [37].

#### **B1. IoT Network Layer Security**

On behalf of IoT devices in WSN context, it is necessary to extend IPv6 over low power wireless personal area networks (6LoWPAN) to facilitate IPsec communication with IPv6 nodes. This is advantageous because the present end-points on the Internet do not want to be altered to interconnect securely with the WSN, and the true E2E safekeeping is implemented lacking the need for a trustworthy gateway. Raza *et al.* [60] projected an E2E secure communication amongst IP enabled sensor networks and the traditional Internet. Their extension lead of LoWPAN supports both IPsec's authentication heading and encapsulation security payload (ESP), so that the communication endpoints are capable to authenticate, encode and check the integrity of mails using standardized and conventional IPv6 mechanisms.

#### **C1. IoT Application Layer Security**


IoT has a widespread variability of applications, containing but not limited to smart household (e.g., education thermostat, smart bulb), medical and healthcare (e.g., real-time health intensive care system), smart city (e.g., smart illumination, smart parking), energy administration (e.g., smart grids, smart metering), environmental observing (e.g., climate monitoring, wildlife following), industrial Internet, and linked vehicle. Most modern IoT devices comprise configurable embedded computer structures. Some are equal running complex software and bordering on general-purpose computers, henceforward they face the identical security hazards as that of general-purpose supercomputers.

### **IoT Data Management**

Traditional data management systems handle the storage, retrieval, and update of elementary data items, records and files. In the context of IoT, data management systems must summarize data online while providing storage, logging, and auditing facilities for offline analysis. This expands the concept of data management from offline storage, query processing, and transaction management operations into online-offline communication/storage dual operations. We first define the data lifecycle within the context of IoT and then outline the energy consumption profile for each of the phases in order to have a better understanding of IoT data management.

### A. IoT Data Lifecycle

The lifespan of data within an IoT system—illustrated in Figure 6—proceeds beginning data production to aggregation, handover, optional filtering and pre-processing, and to conclude to storage and archiving. Querying and analysis are the end points that initiate (request) and consume data production, but data production can be set to be “pushed” to the IoT consuming services [5]. Production, collection, aggregation, filtering, and some basic querying and preliminary processing functionalities are considered online, communication-intensive



operations. Intensive pre-processing, long-term storage and archival and in-depth processing/analysis are considered offline storage-intensive operations.

**Figure 6. IoT data lifecycle and data management.**

Storage procedure target at constructing files accessible on the long term for continuous access/updates, while archival is apprehensive with read-only data. Meanwhile some IoT systems may produce, process, and accumulate data in-network aimed at real-time and localized services, with no essential to broadcast this data

**Querying:** Data-intensive structures rely on querying as the core development to access and retrieve facts. In the context of IoT, a question can be issued either one to request real-time data to be together for temporal monitoring resolutions or to repossess a certain understanding of the data deposited within the system. The first circumstance is typical when a (mostly localized) real-time demand for data is needed. The second case represents more globalized sights of data and in-depth analysis of trends and patterns.

**Production:** Data production consist of sensing and transmission of data by the “Things” surrounded by the IoT framework and broadcasting this data to interested events periodically (as in a subscribe/notify model), pushing it up the net to aggregation facts and consequently to database servers, or sending it as a comeback triggered by queries that demand the data from sensors and smart things. Data is frequently time-stamped and conceivably geo-stamped, and can be in the method of simple key-value pairs, or it possibly will contain rich audio/image/video content, by means of varying degrees of complication separating.

**Collection:** The sensors and smart objects in the interior of IoT may accumulate the data for a definite time interval or report it to central components. Data may be composed at concentration facts or gateways within the network wherever it is further filtered and administered, and possibly attached into compact forms for



efficient communication. Wireless communication tools such as Zigbee, Wi-Fi and cellular are recycled by objects to guide data to collection points.

**Aggregation/Fusion:** Transmitting all the raw data out of the network in real-time is often prohibitively expensive given the increasing data streaming rates and the limited bandwidth. Aggregation and fusion techniques deploy summarization and merging operations in real-time to compress the volume of data to be stored and transmitted [6].

**Delivery:** As data is filtered, accumulated, and possibly handled either at the absorption points or at the autonomous virtual components within the IoT, the consequences of these processes may essentially be sent additional up the system, either as final answers, or for storage and in-depth investigation. Wired or wireless broadband communications could be used here to transfer data to everlasting data stores.

**Pre-processing:** IoT data will originate from different bases with varying formats and assemblies. Data may be essential to be pre-processed to handle missing data, eliminate redundancies and assimilate data from diverse sources into a amalgamated schema before being dedicated to storage. This pre-processing is a known procedure in data mining named data cleaning. Schema integration does not indicate brute-force fitting of all the data into a fixed relational (tables) schema, but reasonably a more abstract definition of a reliable way to access the data short of having to customize access for each source's facts format. Probabilities at dissimilar levels in the schematic may be additional at this phase to IoT data things in order to handle uncertainty that may be existing in data or to deal through the lack of trust that may occur in data sources [7].

**Storage/Update—Archiving:** This segment handles the competent storage and association of data as well as the constant update of data with new statistics as it turn into availability. Archiving denotes to the offline long-term storage of data that is not instantly needed for the system's ongoing processes. The core of centralized storing is the deployment of storage structures that adjust to the various data types and the occurrence of data capture. Relational database management schemes are a popular choice that comprises the organization of data into a table schematic with predefined interrelationships and metadata for efficient recovery at later periods [8]. NoSQL key-value stores are acquisition popularity as storing technologies for their maintenance of big data storage with no confidence on relational schema or strong consistency necessities typical of relational database schemes [9]. Storage can also be dispersed for autonomous IoT systems, where data is kept back at the objects that produce it and is not directed up the system. However, due to the restricted capabilities of such things, storage capacity residues limited in contrast to the unified storage model.

**Processing/Analysis:** This level encompasses the ongoing repossession and investigation operations performed and deposited and archived data in direction to gain insights into antique data and forecast future trends, or to detect irregularities in the data that may activate further investigation or accomplishment. Task-specific pre-processing may be wanted to filter and clean data before significant operations take place. When an IoT subsystem is independent and does not need everlasting storage of its data, but quite keeps the handling and storage in the network.

Looking rear at Figure 6, the movement of data may take one of three tracks: a path for autonomous systems inside the IoT that continues from query to manufacture to in-network dispensation and then delivery, a pathway that starts from manufacture and continues to gather and filtering/combination/fusion and ends with data transfer to introducing (possibly global or nearby real-time) queries, and in conclusion a path that extends the construction to aggregation more and includes pre-processing, everlasting data storage and archival, and in-depth doling out and analysis.

## VI. CONCLUSION

The demonstration of the security and privacy issues in IoT applications and systems has been surveyed. We presented the boundaries of IoT devices in battery and computing resources, and communicated possible solutions for battery life allowance and lightweight computing. We also studied existing arrangement approaches for IoT attacks and security contrivances. The last part of this paper analyzed the security and data



management issues and solutions in four layers, including the perception layer, network layer, and application layer. Overall, the security of commercial IoT devices today depends on the technologies, protocols, and security contrivances realized by each individual manufacturer. Grounded on the specific case, all IoT devices could be vulnerable to certain forms of attacks. The association of international initiatives is quite clearly fast-tracking progress towards an IoT, providing an overarching interpretation for the integration and functional features that can deliver an operational IoT. Notably, they need to overcome the technical, organizational, and regulatory hurdles related with using the IoT technology. In particular, organizations that use IoT technology will need better tools and methods to extract insights and actionable information from enormous IoT data gathered from customers, equipment, and people.

## REFERENCES

- [1] IoT Analytics. (2014). *Why the Internet of Things Is Called Internet of Things: Definition, History, Disambiguation*. [Online]. Available: <https://iot-analytics.com/Internet-of-things-definition/>
- [2] I. Saif, S. Peasley, and A. Perinkolam. (2015). *Safeguarding the Internet of Things: Being Secure, Vigilant, and Resilient in the Connected Age*. [Online]. Available: <https://dupress.deloitte.com/dup-us-en/deloitte-review/issue-17/Internet-of-things-data-security-and-privacy.html>
- [3] Christo Ananth, M.A.Fathima, M.Gnana Soundarya, M.L.Jothi Alphonsa Sundari, B.Gayathri, Praghsh.K, "Fully Automatic Vehicle for Multipurpose Applications", International Journal Of Advanced Research in Biology, Engineering, Science and Technology (IJARBEST), Volume 1, Special Issue 2 - November 2015, pp.8-12.
- [4] B. Lam and C. Larose. (2016). *How Did the Internet of Things Allow the Latest Attack on the Internet?* [Online]. Available: <https://www.privacyandsecuritymatters.com/2016/10/howdid-the-Internet-of-things-allow-the-latest-attack-on-the-Internet/>
- [5] Talkin Cloud. (2016). *IoT Past and Present: The History of IoT, and Where It's Headed Today*. [Online]. Available: <http://talkincloud.com/cloud-computing/iot-past-and-present-history-iot-and-where-its-headed-today?page=2>
- [6] J. Granjal, E. Monteiro, and J. S. Silva, "A secure interconnection model for IPv6 enabled wireless sensor networks," in *Proc. IFIP Wireless Days*, Venice, Italy, Oct. 2010, pp. 1–6.
- [7] S. Sicari, A. Rizzardi, L. Grieco, and A. Coen-Porisini, "Security, privacy and trust in Internet of Things: The road ahead," *Comput. Netw.*, vol. 76, pp. 146–164, Jan. 2015.
- [8] R. Roman, J. Zhou, and J. Lopez, "On the features and challenges of security and privacy in distributed Internet of Things," *Comput. Netw.*, vol. 57, no. 10, pp. 2266–2279, 2013.
- [9] W. Trappe, R. Howard, and R. S. Moore, "Low-energy security: Limits and opportunities in the Internet of Things," *IEEE Security Privacy*, vol. 13, no. 1, pp. 14–21, Jan./Feb. 2015.
- [10] H. Shafagh, A. Hithnawi, A. Droscher, S. Duquennoy, and W. Hu, "Poster: Towards encrypted query processing for the Internet of Things," in *Proc. 21st Annu. Int. Conf. Mobile Comput. Netw. (MobiCom)*, Paris, France, 2015, pp. 251–253.
- [11] R. Kotamsetty and M. Govindarasu, "Adaptive latency-aware query processing on encrypted data for the Internet of Things," in *Proc. 25th Int. Conf. Comput. Commun. Netw. (ICCCN)*, Aug. 2016, pp. 1–7.
- [12] S. A. Salami, J. Baek, K. Salah, and E. Damiani, "Lightweight encryption for smart home," in *Proc. 11th Int. Conf. Availability Reliability Security (ARES)*, Salzburg, Austria, Aug. 2016, pp. 382–388.
- [13] I. Andrea, C. Chrysostomou, and G. Hadjichristofi, "Internet of Things: Security vulnerabilities and challenges," in *Proc. IEEE Symp. Comput. Commun. (ISCC)*, Larnaca, Cyprus, Jul. 2015, pp. 180–187.
- [14] E. Ronen and A. Shamir, "Extended functionality attacks on IoT devices: The case of smart lights," in *Proc. IEEE Eur. Symp. Security Privacy (EuroSP)*, Saarbrücken, Germany, Mar. 2016, pp. 3–12. [15] O. Salman, S. Abdallah, I. H. Elhaji, A. Chehab, and A. Kayssi, "Identity-based authentication scheme for the Internet of Things," in *Proc. IEEE Symp. Comput. Commun. (ISCC)*, Messina, Italy, Jun. 2016, pp. 1109–1111.
- [16] P. Porambage, C. Schmitt, P. Kumar, A. Gurtov, and M. Ylianttila, "Pauthkey: A pervasive authentication protocol and key establishment scheme for wireless sensor networks in distributed IoT applications," in *Int. J. Distrib. Sensor Netw.*, vol. 10, Jul. 2014, Art. no. 357430.
- [17] G. Ho *et al.*, "Smart locks: Lessons for securing commodity Internet of Things devices," in *Proc. 11th ACM Asia Conf. Comput. Commun. Security (ASIA CCS)*, Xi'an, China, 2016, pp. 461–472.
- [18] [www.iot.analytics.com](http://www.iot.analytics.com), [www.dzone.com](http://www.dzone.com),