PROTECTED INFORMATION RETRIEVAL DESIGNED

FORDE CENTRALIZED INTERFERENCE TOLERANT

MILITARY NETWORKS

Thangamalar Yazhini ,Dept of CSE,

MAHA BARATHI ENGINEERING COLLEGE

Abstract:-

Mobilenodesinmilitaryenvironmentssuchasa battlefieldorahostileregionarelikelytosufferfromintermittentnetworkconnectivityandfrequentpartitions.Disruption-tolerantnetwork(DTN)technologiesarebecomingsuccessfulsolutionsthatallowwirelessdevicescarriedbysoldierstocommunicatewitheachotherandaccesstheconfidentialinformationorcommandreliablybyexploitingexternalstoragenodes.Disruption-tolerantnetwork(DTN)technologiesarebecomingsuccessfulsolutionsthatallownodestocommunicatewitheachotherintheseextremenetworkingenvironments.Typically,whenthereisnoend-to-endconnectionbetweenasourceandadestinationpair,themessagesfromthesourcenodemayneedtowaitintheintermediatenodesforasubstantialamountoftimeuntil theconnectionwouldbeeventuallyestablished.Theconceptofattribute-basedencryption(ABE)isapromisingapproach thatfulfillstherequirementsforsecuredataretrievalinDTNs.Especially,Ciphertext-PolicyABE(CP-ABE)providesascalablewayofencryptingdata suchthattheencryptordefinestheattributesetthatthedecryptorneedstopossessinordertodecryptheciphertext.Thus,differentusersareallowedtodecryptdifferentpiecesofdataperthesecuritypolicy.

INTRODUCTION

Inmanymilitarynetworkscenarios,connectionsofwirelessdevicescarriedbysoldiersmaybetemporarilydisconnectedbyjamming,environmentalfactors,andmobility,especiallywhentheyoperateinhostileenvironments.Disruption-tolerantnetwork(DTN)technologiesarebecomingsuccessfulsolutionsthatallownodestocommunicatewitheachotherintheseextremenetworkingenvironments[1]–[3].Typically,whenthere is noend-to-endconnectionbetweenasourceandadestinationpair,themessagesfromthesourcenodemayneedtowaitintheintermediatenodesforasubstantialamountoftimeuntil theconnectionwouldbeeventuallyestablished.RoyandChuah[5]introducedstoragenodesinDTNswheredataisstoredorreplicatedsuchthatonlyauthorizedmobilenodescanaccessthenecessaryinformationquicklyandefficiently.Manymilitaryapplicationsrequireincreasedprotectionofconfidentialdataincludingaccesscontrolmethodsthatarecryptographicallyenforced[6],[7].Inmanycases,itisdesirabletoprovidedifferentiatedaccessservicessuchthatdataaccesspoliciesaredefinedoveruserattributes or roles,whicharemanagedbythekeyauthorities.Forexample,inadisruption-tolerantmilitarynetwork,acommandermaystoreaconfidentialinformationatastoragenode,whichshouldbeaccessedbymembers of"Battalion1"whoareparticipatingin"Region 2."Inthis

case,itisareasonableassumptionthatmultiplekey authoritiesarelikelytomanagetheirowndynamicattributesforsoldiersintheirdeployedregions orechelons,whichcouldbefrequentlychanged(e.g.,theattributerepresentingcurrentlocationof movingsoldiers)[4],[8],[9].Werefertothis DTNarchitecturewhere multipleauthoritiesissueandmanagetheirown attributekeysindependentlyasadecentralized DTN[10].Theconceptofattribute-basedencryption(ABE)[11]–[14]isapromisingapproachthatfulfillstherequirementsforsecuredataretrievalinDTNs.ABEfeaturesamechanismthatenablesanaccesscontroloverencrypteddatausingaccesspoliciesandascribedattributesamongprivatekeysandciphertexts.Especially,ciphertext-policyABE(CP-ABE)providesascalablewayofencryptingdata suchthattheencryptordefinestheattributesetthatthedecryptorneedstopossessinordertodecrypttheciphertext[13].Thus,differentusersareallowedtodecryptdifferentpiecesofdataper thesecuritypolicy.

However,theproblemofapplyingtheABEtoDTNsintroducesseveralsecurityandprivacychallenges.Sincesomeusersmaychangetheirassociatedattributesatsomepoint (forexample, Movingtheirregion),orsomeprivatekeysmight becompromised,keyrevocation(orupdate)foreachattributeisnecessaryinordertomakesystemssecure.However,thisissueisevenmoredifficult,especiallyinABEsystems,sinceeachattribute isconceivablysharedbymultipleusers(henceforth,werefertosuchacollectionof

usersasanattributegroup).This impliesthatrevocationofanyattributeoranysingleuserinanattributegroupwouldaffecttheotherusersinthegroup.Forexample,ifauserjoinsorleavesanattributegroup,theassociatedattributekeyshouldbechangedandredistributedtoallthe othermembersinthesamegroupforbackwardor forwardsecrecy.Itmayresultinbottleneckduringrekeyingprocedure,orsecuritydegradationduetothewindowsofvulnerabilityifthe previousattributekeyisnotupdatedimmediately.

Anotherchallengeisthekeyescrowproblem.InCP-ABE,ekeyauthoritygeneratesprivatekeysofusersbyapplyingtheauthority'smastersecretkeys tousers'associatedsetofatibutes.Thus,thekeyauthoritycandecrypteveryciphertextaddressedtospecificusersbygeneratingtheirattribute keys.

Ifthekeyauthorityiscompromisedbyadversarieswhendeployedinthehostileenvironments,this could beapotentialthreattothedataconfidentialityorprivacyespeciallywhenthedataishighlysensitive.Thekeyescrowisaninherentproblemeveninthemultiple-authoritysystemsaslongaseachkeyauthorityhasthewholeprivilegetogeneratetheirownattributekeyswiththeirownmastersecrets.Sincesuchakeygenerationmechanismbasedonthesinglemastersecretisthebasicmethodformostoftheasymmetricencryptionsystemssuchastheattribute-basedoridentity-basedencryptionprotocols,removingescrowin singleormultiple-authorityCP-ABEisapivotal open problem.

Thelastchallengeisthecoordinationofattributessissuedfromdifferentauthorities.Whenmultipleauthoritiesmanageandissueattributekeystousersindependentlywiththeirownmastersecrets, itisveryhardtodefinefine-grainedaccesspoliciesoverattributesissuedfromdifferentauthorities.Forexample,supposethatattributes"role1"and"region1"aremanagedby theauthorityA,and"role2"and"region2"aremanagedbytheauthorityB.Then,itisimpossibleto generateanaccesspolicy((("role1"OR"role2") AND("region1"or"region2")) inthepreviousschemesbecausetheORlogicbetweenattributesissuedfromdifferentauthorities cannotbeimplemented.Thisisduetothefactthat thedifferentauthoritiesgeneratetheirownattributekeysusingtheirownindependentandindividualmastersecretkeys.Therefore,generalaccess policies,suchas"-out-of-"logic,cannotbeexpressedinthepreviousschemes,whichisaverypracticalandcommonlyrequiredaccess policy logic.

.

1.1ArchitectureOfSecure DataRetrievalIn A Disruption-TolerantMilitaryNetwork

RELATED WORK
Robust Routing in DynamicMANETs

Avarietyofworkhasconsideredtheuseofdisjointroutesinadhocnetworks,including.Inaddition to the overheadcost offindingdisjointpaths,ifanylinkinapathbreaksthenthepathitselfbreaks.Detectionandrecoveryfromfailuresisalsoexpensivesinceitcannotbecarriedoutlocally.Theseconsiderationshavethusmotivatedresearchontheuseofnon-disjointpaths.ThebackuproutingalgorithmofreinforcesthepathselectedbyAODVbyallowingnodesthatoverhearAODVcontrolmessagestobecomepartoftheroutingsubgraph,tobeusedonlywhenlinksontheAODVpathbreak.Proposes ductroutingin mobilepacketradionetworks,wherenodesneighbouringtheprimaryroutemaybeused.Specifically,whensendingpacketstotheithhopnodealongtheprimarypath,oneofeithertheithhopnodeoroneofitsneighbourswillhearthetransmissionfirst.Thefirst nodethathearsthetransmissionwillforwardthepackettothe(i+1)sthopnode;theothernodeswilloverheartheforwardingtransmissionandrefrainfromtransmitting.Consideringanunderwater network,proposesageo-routing meshusingonlynodeswithinagivendistancefromthevectorfromthesourceorcurrentforwardingnodeto thesink.Wenotethat(whenallnodesneighbouringtheprimarypathareused)andbuildroutingsubgraphs whichstructurallycorrespondtowhatwewilldescribeinSectionIVasa1-hopbraid.Braidedmultipathsareproposedinto protectagainstnodefailure.Abraidedmultipath correspondstoselectingaprimary

pathandthenaddinganadditionalpathforeachnodeiontheprimarypaththatdoesnotusenode,possiblyreusingpartsoftheprimarypath.Specificallyconsideringreliability,arguesforthereliabilitybenefitsofusingnon-disjointpathsinwirelessmeshnetworks,showinggainsoverdisjointpaths.Considerstheproblemoffindingthemostreliablesubgraphforrouting.Duetothe#P-hardnessofthisproblem,theyproposeamethodtoapproximatelycomputereliabilityandaroutingalgorithmthatleveragesknowncontactprobabilitiesbetweennodepairstoselectaroutingsubgraph.Ideally,foragivensourceanddestination,andspecifiednumberofedgesornodes,wewouldselectthesubgraphthathasmaximum2-terminalreliabilitywhileusingatmostthespecifiednumberoflinksornodes.Computingreliabilityexactly,however,isgenerally#P-complete,asissolvingthecorrespondingoptimization problem.Forall-terminalreliability(theprobabilitythatagraphis connected),givesarandomizedfullypolynomialtimeapproximationscheme.Forveryreliablegraphs,showsthatonlysmallcutsarelikelytofailandthatthereareonlyapolynomialnumberofsuchcuts,otherwiseMonteCarlosimulationmaybeused.The approachincouldpresumablybeusedtoapproximate2-terminalreliability,althoughthis does notefficientlysolvetheoptimizationproblem,norlenditselfeasilytotheoreticalcomparisonsofthereliabilityofdifferentsubgraphs.

Giventhedifficultyofexactlycomputingreliability,exceptforrelativelysimplenetworks,wealsouse Monte Carlo

simulationtoestimatereliability.Inadiscrete-timesimulationofatime-varyingnetwork,wecancheckwhetherthereisapathfromthesourcetothedestinationateachtime-step.Theratioofthenumberoftime-stepswhentherewasapathandthetotalnumberoftime-stepssimulatedisthenanestimateoftheprobabilityoftherebeingatleastonepathfromsourcetodestination.Werefertocomputingthereliabilityinthiswayas"computingthereliabilityexperimentally."

Analysingtheoverheadinmobilead-hocnetworkwithaHierarchicalroutingstructure

InthispaperweevaluateanalyticallytheexpectedoverheadreductiongeneratedbytheroutingprotocolwhenweadoptahierarchicalroutingschemeinMANET.Wespecificallyevaluatetheoverheadincurredbythecurrentroutingprotocols(reactiveandproactive)usedinMANET,then,wemodifytheobtainedmodelstoincludetheparameterstorepresentthehierarchicalstructure(subnet,
addressaggregation).Finally,wecomparethesemodelstogetapreliminaryideaof thereductionincurredbyourproposal.ThemainobjectiveofthispaperisnottosolveallthetechnologicalissuesariseninMANETsifsubnettingsolutionsareapproachedbuttoshowthataneffort in that direction is valuable.

Therest of thepaper is organized as follows:agenericdescriptionofthescenariocharacteristicsandthechallengesthatwehavetosolveforintegratingsuccessfully thehierarchicalroutingtoMANETaregivenin

sectionII.Then,wepresenttheanalyticalmodeloftheoverheadgeneratedbytheroutingmechanisms.Finally,wehavetheconclusionsandfuture work.

AntHocNet:AnAdaptiveNature-InspiredAlgorithmforRoutinginMobileAd Hoc Networks

AssimulationsoftwareweuseQualnet.Weranexperimentswithtwodifferentbasesettings.Inthesetting,100nodesarerandomlyplacedinsideanareaof3000_1000m2.Eachexperimentisrunfor900seconds.Datatra_cisgeneratedby20constantbitrate(CBR)sourcessendingone64-bytepacketpersecond.Eachsourcestartssendingatarandomtimebetween0and180secondsafterthestartofthesimulation,andkeepssendinguntiltheend.Atthephysical layeratwo-raysignalpropagationmodelisused.Theradiopropagationrangeofthenodesis300meters,andthedatarateis2Mbit/s.AttheMAClayerweusethe802.11bDCFprotocol.Forthedi_erentexperimentsinthissetting,wevariedthemovementpatternsofthenodes.Wedidtestswiththerandomwaypointmobilitymodel,inwhichwe variedthemaximum speedandthepausetime,andwiththeGauss-Markovmobilitymodel,inwhichweagainvariedthemaximumspeed.TheGauss-MarkovmovementscenariosweregeneratedwiththeBonnMotionsoftware.Parametervalueswerekeptasfollows:theupdatefrequencywas2.5,theanglestandarddeviation0.4,andthespeedstandarddeviation0.5.Forthesecondsetting,weusedthesamesetupas

wasusedinthescalabilitystudyofAODVperformedbyLee,Belding-RoyerandPerkins.Inthisstudy,thenumberofnodesandthesizeofthesimulationareaarevaried,whilekeepingtheaveragenodedensityconstant(_7:5).Theauthorsdoexperiments with up to 10000 nodes, but duetocomputationalconstraintswelimitedourteststomaximum1500nodes.Theexactvaluesusedforthenumberofnodesandthesizeoftheareaaregivenintable1.Otherpropertiesofthesimulationsetuparekeptconstantoverthedifferenttestscenarios.Thedatatrafficconsistsof20CBRsourcessendingfour512-bytepacketspersecond.Thenodesmoveaccordingtotherandomwaypointmodel,withaminimumspeedof0m/s,amaximumspeedof10m/s,andapause timeof 30seconds.

Theradiopropagationrangeofthenodesis250meters,andthechannelcapacityis2Mb/s.ThechoiceoftheabovedescribedscenariosisbasedontheresultsobtainedforanearlierversionofAntHocNet,whicharedescribedin.InthatpaperweinvestigatedthebehaviorofAntHocNetinthebasicscenariousedintheinuentialcomparativestudyof. Thisscenario isverydenselypacked,with50nodeswitharadiorangeof300metersinanareaof1500300m2.Insuchanenvironment,withhighinterferenceandveryshortpaths,itisclearthattheadvantagesofmaintainingmultiplepaths,stochasticallyspreadingdata,usinglocalrepair,etc.,donotoutweightheircosts.Asimple,reactiveapproachasAODVisexpectedtobemuchmoree_ective.Inthetestsweran,itbecameclearthatastheenvironmentbecamemore difficult(more

mobility,moresparseness,longerpaths),thecharacteristicsofAntHocNetbecameanadvantageoverthoseofAODV,resultinginanincreasingperformancegapinfavorofAntHocNet.Inthispaperwestartfromalargerandsparsernetwork,andinvestigateagaintheeffectofincreasingthemobilityandthesize.Thestudyonlargenetworksisnecessarytovalidatethescalabilityofourapproach.Inthefollowing,algorithmsareevaluatedintermsofaverageend-to-enddelayperpacketanddeliveryratio(i.e.,thefractionofsuccessfullydelivereddatapackets).ThesearetwoimportantmeasuresofeffectivenessforMANETroutingalgorithms.Apartfromthat,wealsoconsiderthedelayjitterandtheroutingoverhead.Delayjittermeasurespacketdelayvariation.ItisametricusedinQoSapplicationsandalsoprovidesameasureofthestabilityofthealgorithm'sresponsetochangesinthenetworktopology.Delayjitteriscalculatedastheaverageofthedifferenceoftheinterarrivaltimebetweensubsequentlyreceivedpackets:ifthelastthreepacketsarereceivedrespectivelyatt3;t2;t1,thesession'sjitteriscalculatedasthearithmeticaverageofthevalues $(t3 - t2) - (t2 - t1)$ foralltripletsofreceivedpackets.Thisdefinitionofjitterwasproposedin[36]andisusedinQualnetandinanumberofreal-worldroutingdevices.Theroutingoverheadmeasuresthealgorithm'sinternalefficiencyandiscalculatedas the total numberofcontrolpacketssentdividedbythenumberofdatapacketsdeliveredsuccessfully.

Self-AdaptiveOnDemandGeographicRoutingProtocolsforMobileAdHocNetworks

Theconventionalon-demandroutingprotocols(e.g.,)ofteninvolvefloodinginroutediscovery,whichlimitsthescalability.Toreduceoverhead,LARreducesthefloodingrangebymakinguseofthenodes'positioninformation.Unlike topology-basedroutingprotocols,geographicroutingisbasedonmobilenodes'positions.ExistinggeographicroutingprotocolshavemanylimitationsasdiscussedinSectionI.Authorsinattemptedtoremovetheproactivebeaconsingeographicroutingprotocols.However,thesimplecontention-basedschemeadoptedmayleadtoredundantpacketforwardingandhighercollisionprobability,andhenceitcannotworkproperlywhenthetrafficloadishigh.Sonetal.Conductsasimulation-basedstudyonthenegativeeffectofmobility-inducedlocationerroronroutingperformance.Instead,weproposetwoon-demandadaptivegeographicroutingprotocolsthatcanmeetdifferentapplicationandtrafficneedsandadapttodifferentconditions.Fixed-intervalbeaconingcommonlyadoptedincurrentgeographicroutingprotocolsmayresultinoutdatedlocaltopologyknowledgeattheforwardingnode,whichleadstonon-optimalroutingandforwardingfailure.1)Non-optimalrouting.Fig.1(a)showsanexampleofnon-optimalroutingduetotheoutdatedlocaltopologyknowledge.NodeBjustmovedintoA'stransmissionrange,whichisunknowntoA.WithoutknowinganyneighborclosertothedestinationG,Awill

forwardthepackettonodeCthenDbyusing perimeterforwarding.Theresultedpathhasfive hops,whiletheoptimalpathbetweenAandGshouldhaveonlytwohopsafterB bridgesthevoidbetweenAandG.

2)Forwardingfailure.Inliteraturework,anode willkeepaneighbor'sinformation untiltimeoutevenwhentheneighborhasmoved outofitstransmissionrangeandthetimeoutintervalisoftensetasmultiplebeaconingintervals.Forwardingfailurewillhappenwhenthenodeforwardspacketstosucha"false"neighbor(e.g.,Fig.1 (b))andresultinpacketdroppingorrerouting.Moreseriously,beforedetectingtheunreachability, the continuousretransmissionsatMAClayerwill reducethelinkthroughputandfairness,andincreasethecollisions.Thiswillfurtherincreasedelay andenergyconsumption.Introduce our route optimization schemes.Inbothprotocols,weassumeeverymobilenodeisawareofitsownposition,asourcecan obtainthedestination'spositionthroughsomekindoflocationservice,andpromiscuousmodeisenabledonmobilenodes'networkinterfaces.Inthefollowingpresentation,exceptwhenexplicitly indicated,Frepresentsthecurrentforwardingnode,Disthedestination,NdenotesoneofF'sneighbors,posAisthepositioncoordinatesofAanddis(A,B)isthedistance between nodeAandB.

ACluster-BasedMultipathDynamicSource Routing inMANET

Recently,therehavebeensomeworksonmultipathroutinginadhocnetworks.InTORA,thesourcenodeconstructsmul-tiple

routesbyflooding aquerymessage followedbyasetofupdatemessages.However, TORAdoesnothaveanymechanismstoevaluatethequalityofthesemultiplepathsandthisleadstoitspoorperformance.SMRextendsDSRinthe waythatthedestinationcandiscovertwopathsfor eachrouterequest,inwhichoneistheshortestpath,andtheotheristhemaximumdisjointpath.In, A.NasipuriandS.R.DasprovethattheuseofmultiplepathsinDSRcankeepcorrectend-to-endtransmissionforalongertimethanasinglepath.Inotherwords,thefrequencyofsearchingfor newroutesismuch lower ifanodekeeps multiple paths toadestination.ThisisthefirstdeepstudyonperformancebenefitsofmultipathroutinginMANETs.However,theydidnotstudytheperformance improvementofmultipathroutingonnetworkloadbalancing.Theirperformancestudyisbasedontheoreticalanalysis,whereitisdifficulttotakeintoaccounttheinfluenceofnodes'arbitrarymovementsandunreliableradiotransmission.MultipleSourceRoutingprotocol(MSR)proposesaweightedround-robinheuristic-basedschedulingstrategyamongmultiplepaths inordertodistributeload,butprovidesnoanalyticalmodelingofitsperformance.M.R.Perlmanetal.demonstratethatmultipathroutingcanbalancenetworkloadin.Theyalsoproposeadiversityinjectionmethodtofindmorenode-disjointpathscomparedtoDSR.However,their workisbasedonmultiplechannelnetworks,whicharecontentionfreebutmaynotbeavailableinsomeapplicationsscenarios.MP-DSRconsidersthedynamicnatureofnetworktopologyaswellastheimportanceto offercontinuous network

connectionincertainmissioncriticalappli cations.

Thus,theobjectiveoftheprotocolistoimproveth elevelofservicebyprovidingguaranteewithres pecttoend-to-endreliability,andtoprobabilisticallyguarantee therequiredconnectionlifetime.Butitdoesnotc onsiderthescalabilityproblem.OurCMDSRsol vesthereliabilityproblembyselectivelychoosi ngmorereliablepathsandbyprovidingsoftguar anteesontheend-to-endreliability.Inaddition,ourprotocolusestheh ierarchicalstructurewhichcancopeefficiently withanincreasingnodedensityandasignificant numberof nodes.It makes the protocol morescalable.

PROPOSED SYSTEM:

Especially,ciphertext-policyABE(CP-ABE)providesascalablewayofencryptingdata suchthattheencryptordefinestheattributesetth atthedecryptorneedstopossessinordertodecry pttheciphertext.Thus,differentusersareallowe dtodecryptdifferentpiecesofdataperthesecurit ypolicy.InCP-ABE,thekeyauthoritygeneratesprivatekeysof usersbyapplyingtheauthority'smastersecretke ystousers'associatedsetofattributes.Thus,thek eyauthoritycandecrypteveryciphertextaddres sedtospecificusersbygeneratingtheirattribute keys.Ifthekeyauthorityiscompromisedbyadve rsarieswhendeployedinthehostileenvironmen ts,thiscouldbeapotentialthreattothedataconfid entialityorprivacyespeciallywhenthedataishi ghlysensitive.Thekeyescrowisaninherentprob lemeveninthemultiple-authoritysystemsas longaseachkeyauthorityhasthewholeprivilege togenerate

theirownattributekeyswiththeirownmastersec rets.Sincesuchakeygenerationmechanismbas edonthesinglemastersecretisthebasicmethodf ormostoftheasymmetricencryptionsystemssu chastheattribute-basedoridentity-basedencryptionprotocols,removingescrowin singleormultiple-authorityCP-ABEisapivotalopenproblem.

MODULEDESCRIPTION :

1. KeyAuthorities :

Theyarekeygenerationcentersthatgen eratepublic/secretparametersforCP-ABE. Thekeyauthoritiesconsist of a centralauthorityandmultiplelocalauthorities. Weassumethattherearesecureandreliablecom municationchannelsbetweenacentralauthority andeachlocalauthorityduringtheinitialkeysetu pandgenerationphase.Eachlocalauthorityman agesdifferentattributesandissues correspondingattributekeys tousers.Theygrantdifferentialaccessrightstoin dividualusers basedontheusers'attributes.Thekeyauthoritie sareassumedtobehonest-but-curious.Thatis,theywillhonestlyexecutetheas signedtasksinthesystem,howevertheywouldli keto learninformationofencryptedcontentsasmuch aspossible.

2. Storagenode:

Thisisanentitythatstoresdatafromsend ersandprovidecorrespondingaccesstousers.It maybemobileorstatic.Similartotheprevioussc hemes,wealsoassumethe

storagenode to besemi-trusted, that ishonest-but-curious.

3. Sender :

Thisisanentitywhoownsconfidentialmessagesordata(e.g.,acommander)andwishesto storethemintotheexternaldatastoragenodeforeaseofsharingorforreliabledeliverytousersinth eextremenetworkingenvironments.Asenderis responsiblefordefining(attributebased)access policyandenforcingitonitsowndatabyencrypti ngthedataunderthepolicybefore storingit tothe storage node.

4. Soldier(User) :

Thisisamobilenodewhowantstoaccess thedatastoredatthestoragenode(e.g.,asoldier). Ifauserpossessesasetofattributessatisfyingthe accesspolicyoftheencrypteddatadefinedbythe sender,andisnotrevokedinanyoftheattributes,t henhewillbeabletodecrypt theciphertextandobtain the data.

5. CP-ABE Method :

InCiphertextPolicyAttributebasedEnc ryptionscheme,theencryptorcanfixthepolicy, whocandecrypttheencryptedmessage.Thepoli cycanbeformedwiththehelpofattributes.InCP-ABE,accesspolicyissentalongwiththecipherte xt.Weproposeamethodinwhichtheaccesspolic yneednotbesentalongwiththeciphertext,by whichweareabletopreservetheprivacyoftheen cryptor.Thistechniquesencrypteddatacanbeke ptconfidentialevenifthestorageserverisuntrust ed;moreover,ourmethodsare secureagainstcollusionattacks.PreviousAttrib ute-BasedEncryption

systemsusedattributestodescribetheencrypted dataandbuiltpoliciesintouser'skeys;whileinou rsystemattributesareusedtodescribeauser'scre dentials,andapartyencryptingdatadeterminesa policyforwhocandecrypt.

SIMULATION

CONCLUSION

DTNtechnologiesarebecomingsuccessfuls olutionsinmilitaryapplicationsthatallowwirel essdevicestocommunicatewitheachotheranda ccesstheconfidentialinformationreliablybyex ploitingexternalstoragenodes.CP-ABEisascalablecryptographicsolutiontotheac cesscontrolandsecuredataretrievalissues.Inthi spaper,weproposedanefficientandsecuredatar etrievalmethodusingCP-ABEfordecentralizedDTNs wheremultiplekeyauthoritiesmanagetheirattri butesindependently.Theinherentkeyescrowpr oblemisresolvedsuchthattheconfidentialityoft hestoreddataisguaranteedevenunderthehostil eenvironmentwherekeyauthoritiesmightbeco mpromisedornotfullytrusted.Inaddition,thefin e-grainedkeyrevocationcanbedoneforeachattrib utegroup.Wedemonstratehowtoapplytheprop osedmechanismtosecurelyandefficientlyman agetheconfidentialdatadistributedinthe disruption-tolerant militarynetwork.

REFERENCES

[1]J.Burgess,B.Gallagher,D.Jensen,and B. N. Levine, "Maxprop: Routing forvehicle-baseddisruptiontolerantnetworks,"in *Proc.IEEE INFOCOM*, 2006, pp. 1–11.[2]M.ChuahandP.Yang,"Nodedensity-based adaptive routing scheme fordisruption tolerantnetworks,"in *Proc .IEEEMILCOM*, 2006, pp.1–6.
[3] M.M.B.Tariq,M.Ammar,andE.Zequra,"Mess ageferryroutedesignforsparseadhocnetworks withmobilenodes,"in*Proc.ACMMobiHoc*, 2006, pp. 37–48.
[4]S.RoyandM.Chuah,"Securedataretrievalb asedonciphertextpolicyattribute-basedencryption(CP-ABE)systemfortheDTNs,"LehighCSETech. Rep.,2009.
[5]M.ChuahandP.Yang,"Performanceevaluat ionofcontent-basedinformationretrievalschemesforDTNs," in*Proc.IEEEMILCOM*, 2007, pp. 1–7.
[6]M.Kallahalla,E.Riedel,R.Swaminathan,Q. Wang,andK.Fu,"Plutus:Scalablesecurefilesha ringonuntrustedstorage,"in*Proc.Conf.FileSto rageTechnol.*,2003,pp.29–42.
[7]L.Ibraimi,M.Petkovic,S.Nikova,P.Hartel,a ndW.Jonker,"Mediatedciphertext-policyattribute-basedencryptionanditsapplication,"in*Proc.W ISA*,2009,LNCS 5932, pp. 3 09–323.
[8]N.Chen,M.Gerla,D.Huang,andX.Hong,"S ecure,selectivegroupbroadcastinvehicularnet worksusingdynamicattributebasedencryption ,"in*Proc.AdHocNetw*.*Worksho p*, 2010, pp. 1–8.
[9]D.HuangandM.Verma,"ASPE:Attribute-basedsecurepolicyenforcementinvehicularad hocnetworks,"*AdHocNetw*.,vol. 7, no. 8, pp. 1526–1535, 2009.
[10]A.LewkoandB.Waters,"Decentralizingat tribute-basedencryption,"CryptologyePrintArchive: Rep.2010/351,2010.
[11] A. SahaiandB.Waters,"Fuzzyide ntity-basedencryption," in *Proc*.